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dC: Could you start by summarizing the idea of liberal racism that informs much of your work?
CN: Most basically, liberal racism refers to attitudes and actions that
look antiracist or at least race-neutral on the surface but that have racist
effects. It opposes explicit discrimination on the basis of race or color,
and rejects simple white supremacism of a kind that says members of
other racial groups are inferior to whites. But it supports systems that
favor whites over most other groups when those systems don't use
color but some other factor like "merit" to make their decisions. And
since explicit white supremacy is less common today than it was even
thirty years ago, liberal racism is becoming a more important way of
maintaining racial inequality.
Liberal racism has been around a long time, since 1820 or 1830 at
least. One of its crucial sources was abolitionism. Most abolitionists
wanted to end slavery for various good reasons but could not imagine
that there was any biological or cultural basis for black/white equality.
Liberal racism favors the reduction of cruelty and even exploitation
while maintaining an understanding of racial rankings in which whites
are on top. Abolitionism was of course a courageous and invaluable position, but the attitudes on which it usually rested did not achieve
post-slavery racial equality in large part because they didn't want racial
equality. Only a small group of "radical .reconstructionists" imagined
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social equality between the races. This aversion to full equality is a major reason why we have not yet completed racial reconstruction over
130 years after the end of the Civil War. People always say "getting rid
of prejudice takes time." That's true, especially when they're still hanging on to it.
There's another important meaning of the term liberal racism-as a
form of what Avery Gordon and I called "white philosophy." Liberals
sometimes say to racialized groups, "well, it's not that we think your
way of life is deficient, we aren't getting into that question. What's deficient is your belief about your identity, about your status as a socially
marked racial group. It's biased and irrational." The liberal racist
doesn't claim a cultural superiority to the racialized group. He claims
that the group's claim to be a group is a conceptual mistake. This is a
managerial position-it manages other groups in the name of reason
while claiming its own neutrality; it rejects attempts to correct for racial
inequality; it says that race is not only a biological but a social fiction,
and a racist one at that. Jim Crow racism was good for keeping black
folks out of restaurants and denying them the vote. Liberal racism is
good for maintaining racial stratification in integrated corporations.
In at least one way, liberal racism is worse than the old cultural
supremacism. The old form may have thought that African American
cultures were deficient-to stick with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s example-but agreed that they had the right to identify themselves and
define themselves as distinct. The managerial version says they don't
have the right to define themselves as a culturally or historically or socially distinct group-that this is an irrational return to biological notions of identity. What Gordon and I call white philosophy-claiming
itself to be colorblind and universally rational- asserts the right of its
own philosophical arguments not only to evaluate but to deny the existence of these other groups.
Look at the attacks on affirmative action. Many of its opponents say
that any kind of awareness of race as a social fact is philosophically
wrong and itself racist. They therefore don't have to discuss the social
inequality that led to affirmative action in the first place. They don't
have to get into a complex conversation about which programs did and
didn't work, how much, and for whom. This is liberal racism in both
senses I've just described. It consents to racial inequality-says it's a
less important problem than race consciousness. And it asserts the right
unilaterally to set the terms of debate, to decide what categories are in
and out, which identities are allowable and which are not, whose injuries matter more than others, and all this regardless of what other involved people think and want.
The journalist Jim Sleeper has written a book arguing that only

colorblindness, willful blindness to socially-defined race, avoids racism. He calls race consciousness "liberal racism." Don't be fooled by
this misuse of the term! Sleeper's position is itself liberal racism, in the
two senses I've described-the acceptance of white social superiority,
and the assertion of the wholesale superiority of color-blind axioms to
the self-understandings of other groups.
dC: In your book, you note that "Emerson adheres to notions of
herrenvolk democracy among the best white strains, but he does not
only invoke race as a foundation of English superiority for he uses race
to install corporate democracy." To what extent do you see Emerson's
political ideology as having influenced the current relationship of race
and corporate hierarchy in America?
CN: Well, that passage refers to Emerson's understanding of Englishness and intra-white mixing-the mixing of Saxons with Angles,
Welsh, Scots, and other indigenous groups, all of whom are "white."
The English nation was an amalgamation of conquest, as Emerson observes, and he uses the concept of race as a way to homogenize and
unify as "English" what are culturally antagonistic groups of white
people. "Race" establishes the whiteness of English people and thereby
eliminates internal differences and internal conflict about fundamental
cultural practices. The result is that quotation marks are no longer necessary around "English"- it's no longer an artificial construct or accepted fiction but a stable, coherent identity and a unified culture.
Emerson can then call his book English Traits without apologetics and
winking.
English Traits was published in 1856 and went into a second edition
that same year. By that time anti-slavery forces-Emerson among
them-are facing the prospect of dividing the country. England is an
initially divided country that became the most powerful nation in the
world. So the principle of English unity would naturally arouse great
interest in a United States that is starting to come apart. When Emerson
links English race to English nation, he establishes a very flexible, almost cultural understanding of race as the unifying principle of the nation. He makes race in this sense more important as the ground of
nationhood and national life than parliament, the public, or the crown
itself.
What this means is that a proper nation is a nation that unites
around the similar instincts, fundamental values, core impulses, habits
of mind and world view that are associated with a particular race. This
resonates with all sorts of longings in Americans for a national identity
that will survive the slavery controversy by offering a kind of cultural
homogeneity, one which is always being confused with racial homogeneity. This idea of the national citizen omits slaves and the later
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racialized freedpersons-they can be present, they can work and be
paid, but though free they can't become national citizens in the deep
psycho-cultural sense.
We still live in the post-Civil War period. In the late 1980s and
1990s, the ruckus about multiculturalism raised the same issue. What if
we have several American cultures? People like Schlesinger predicted
the "disuniting" of the nation itself. This bad debate has been all such a
lost opportunity. We excel at segregation-Indian reservations, barrios,
ethnic enclaves. We could have started to figure out how to have some
kind of federated system, some interdependent independence for voluntarily self-identified groups. We could explore how mobile and multiple people's group identities are. We could explore how group
boundaries overlap and shift. We could work on really bringing in everybody in the multiracial, culturally contradictory, multinational,
even multicontinental nation we've always been, or on really leaving
them alone. How do you share resources, understand, respect, or include people in a country where, for example, 70 to 100 languages are
spoken in the homes of the students of the Los Angeles "Unified "
School District? This is an enormous and exciting challenge. The 21st
century will turn on our success or failure with it. But instead w e've
mostly heard versions of the Emerson-like idea that a true nation rests
on a quasi-racial cultural unity, and w e've heard versions of an idea
Emerson would reject-that America is really English. We're quite
stuck, I think.
dC: So, if you take out Emerson's idea of race as the unifying principle,
then are you saying we don' t need any type of primary system of unity
or something else that unifies us?
CN: I'm saying unity is overrated. It's not necessary. Cultural and political systems hang together through successful negotiation. All human
systems are heterogeneous in fact, and none are actually ruled by a unifying law. People who call for adherence to a unifying law are usually
calling for adherence to their law. We know this in personal relationships. Marriage vows don't say "and as you are joined at the altar on
this day so shall you be joined unto death." There is no marriage constitution, and the vows are flexible, they are interp reted. She plays golf; he
watches movies. Or she gardens and he writes detective novels. The
whole idea that difference is anarchy is ridiculous. Oppression, unjust
misery, p rejudice, exploitation-they can create anarchy, and that is
sometimes preferable. But the presence of difference and interpretation
do not. We even know this about the law- one of our three branches of
government does reinterpretation of the law full-time. The executive,
the legislative, the interpretive: these are our three branches. We negotiate in love, in business and in law . Why would negotiating cultures

uniquely bring us to the brink of war?
I think that as d emographics change, as economic relationships
change, as the econom y changes, racial deals have to be able to change.
So the d eal in the 70s about h igher education in California, which is a
situation I'm involved in, has to be redone. Now, over fifty percent of
the graduates of California high schools are people of color. That means
we have to re-imagine what the University of California is going to look
like and do. So far, I think the way we're responding is to withdraw.
"Well, you know, if Berkeley's freshman class, in 1994, is only 1/ 3
white, which was indeed the case, then should we, the white taxpayers
of California, really be spending so much money on it? Now that its
somebody else's Un iversity, like all those rich Asians?" I think that's
the unspoken, unconscious kind of thought some people have. And if
we establish the principle - this isn' t going to do it automatically but if we establish the principle that social relationships are negotiable,
and must be re-negotiated from a position of respect and mutual interaction and relative equity in the power of the people at the table, then
we can talk about those things w ithout the same kinds of phobias. So I
don't argue that if we engage in, recognize renegotiation, we'll get rid
of Anglo anxieties about the color of Berkeley, because that is inevitable. But I do think that we can at least acknowledge the racial anxiety
and have a more honest discussion abou t living and sharing resources
in a changing world.
dC: You note the civil anxiety of ou r times. Recent scholarship on the
colonial nation has suggested that the unified picture that we see of
them is a construct, that there is really a lot of d isunity and argument in
this attempt at negotiation that you're talking about. Yet your description of Emerson places h im as a central figu re around which society
seems to unify. Is it that by Emerson we don't have that negotiation
anymore or d oes Emerson codify the debate?
CN: Here's the power of Emerson. H e codifies the law in the moment of
individual emancipation from it. This is the tricky thing. Lots of people
came along before and after and said, "authority, hierarchy, listen to
your m asters, listen to you r elders, listen to your ministers, we must
have obedience and deference to have a society." This was a truism in
the New England that Emerson grew up in. This is the kind of thing
that is really easy to rebel against because it's openly controlling, it's
openly elitist, it has open contempt for mass democracy, and it openly
disavows respect for the masses, who it sees as essentially mediocre.
Dem ocracy and mediocrity, for New England's elites, are the same
thing.
Emerson wanted to figure out what to do with the people who are
not right a t the top. That's what democracy is all about - figuring out
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how the U.S. is going to be their.country. They're the vast majority; they
live here; they do most of the work; they' re the ones that the country finally has to be able to grow with and for. So, Emerson understood a lot
of this; he was extremely shrewd about the problems with that simple
deference culture of which his father was part. He hated it on some
level, and you know this is part of my real attraction to him, my ongoing attraction to him. He thought it was suffocating and controlling and
he really disliked Unitarian church doctrine for having an utterly
wishy-washy understanding of freedom. He's the guy from whom I
learned the problem with halfway covenants - that's an allusion to the
controversies in the 1660s and 1670s where the congregationalist
church was opened up to membership for the "non-elect" without allowing the non-elect to have governing power. That's the primal semidemocratic American compromise. We can't just keep them out, so
we're going to let them in but we're not going to give them ruling authority.
What Emerson did was recognize that Unitarianism in the early
nineteenth century was still a halfway covenant. But then he broke with
it. His famous line is, if our heart should guide our interpretation of
scripture as the Unitarians believed, if we don't need church leadership
to lead our readings, why not go to our own hearts first? That is the
great antinomian impulse in America Protestantism that I've always
liked. Emerson takes it to the next level. But then he sets up his own
compromise. His power comes from saying, have self-reliance, trust
thyself, open yourself to your impulses, be all that you can be, free the
real power that is you on the inside, and then at the same time, in that
same instant, reconnect the liberatory moment to a source in higher law
than the liberated individual. Emerson follows a three-step movement:
over and over and over he proclaims individual liberation; then he
moves to a second step, how this connects up with other people, his
democratic stand; then he takes the third step, which folds both of those
things, individual emancipation and group emancipation, into a metaphysical and eternal foundation.
The reason I think he's so influential is that he's so great at wedding
opposite things. You get emancipation and s·u bmission at the same
time. Freedom means not full self-direction, but blessed confirmation
by a higher power. That's why I call it submissive individualism.
The attraction of this subjectivity is you can feel like you're rebelling, yet you don't actually have to. I think this is the baseline identity
of the white collar, white middle class culture that was just beginning
to fo rm after the Civil War through new professions and new corporate
structures. It produces people like us, like me.
When I was in high school, I was supposed to become a p hysician,

but I decided I didn't want to do that fo r various reasons. Mostly the
reason was that my biology and physics classes had absolutely nothing
to do with me, with emotional turmoil, with this whole level of reality
that seemed irrational, psychological, irresistible. It had to be known. I
stopped taking science and I switched into the humanities, and for a
long time my inevitable d estiny was to be a writer. I didn't know what
that meant because I grew up in a middle class family where the only
viable means of staying in the middle class was to become a professional.
So, I had this weird hybridized dual consciousness about what I
was supposed to be. I was this agonistic young Byron, who wrote endlessly in my journal in my bed room and would get really upset when
my mother interrupted me to do chores or to come to dinner because I
was making art understood as passionate self-expression. Then, look
what actually happened. I went to graduate school, not in creative writing, but to become a teacher, and became profoundly bureaucratized. I
became a middle manager; that's what I am tod ay. I am like a line supervisor in a large corporation where the vast majority of my working
life is not about passionate self-expression, really funky experience,
weird traveling all over the place, living like Tom Waits in fleabag hotels, meeting the restless of the earth and telling great stories about the
margins. I deal w ith the center. I deal with middle class kids who go to
a state school and want to become p rofessionals and I teach them how
to be good, professional bureaucrats like me, meaning not totally repressed, but at the same time having good skills, good self-discipline,
and good self-management techniques. So, I'm still living this double
life and that's also what I teach.
In the fifties, we would have called this " the gray flannel rebel." The
man had a n ine to five job that paid a nice middle class salary so that he
could support a fa mily in a really nice house with a back yard and they
could take vacations. He would go and push paper during the day, and
then every night he would come home, knock back a couple martinis,
and complain sardon ically about how superior he was to life with the
schmucks at the office. Then the next morning, he'd wake up with a
little hangover and go back to the office and be one of the schmucks he
despised , come back, complain about it. He never quit his job, never actually wrote the great American novel, but perpetually thought about
and lived out the contradiction between those two roles. And only one
of them existed in the world.
This is part of Emerson's legacy that still needs to be dealt with.
This performative yet disavowed conformity is a major psychologized
barrier to the kind of racial negotiation and man's democracy we discussed before.
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whit~ness con ferenc~. Some. participants wanted to say, okay, here's

dC: Keeping in mind how Emerson helped construct a socio-political
way for us both to admit and ignore things at the same time and the
current theoretical move to examine whiteness as an unconsciousness
ideology that structures our current socio-political system, how do you
believe becoming aware of whiteness as race, as a color, might allow us
to attack the liberal racist system?
CN: I don't think awareness of whiteness in itself does anything, one
way or the other. The Klan is really aware of its whiteness. Middle-class
awareness of whiteness could mean thinking, "I'm really aware that
I'm getting screwed by all these affirmative action babies." So, there has
to be some awareness of subtler forms of white racial anxiety, of how
race structures so many social things. The current context makes that
hard. Someone writes a new white backlash book every fifteen minutes.
They all say white racism doesn't really exist, except in the form of antidiscrimination programs. Whiteness studies has its work cut out for it.
dC: Right now in the United States, whiteness is the norm and "other"
races are invested with color. For example, even the phrase "people of
color" as used to designated non-white races reinforces the primacy of
whiteness and erases the racial status of "white." So, becoming aware
of the subtle yet fundamental ways in which the primacy of whiteness
structures our society- recognizing whiteness as property in addition
to ~eing a racial affiliation - becomes essential to recognizing white
racism.
CN: Yes, I think that's very important. I also think that it has to be
coupled with two other things, so it's actually triple consciousness. The
first is a critique of subtle racism; the second is the retrieval of historical
examples, of multi-racial work; and the third is a more utopian move~ent beyond precedent toward new forms of non-unifying collaboration.
I think that we have to do more work on retrieving historical moments in which the white working class is not simply racist, in which
the Irish resisted becoming white if it meant attacking Black folks, or in
which unions did produce cross racial solidarities that were successful
for a long time. For example, there's the longshoreman's union that a
scholar named David Wellman talked about at the Berkeley conference.
It was based in San Francisco and actually did manage to organize a
very multiracial, not just black/white, but a multiracial group of longshoreman by submerging white consciousness in labor issues. I think
that that sort of memory is really crucial.
I also think that it will involve - and this is going to be a very p ainful ~roc~ss - thinking a?out viable forms of white racial identity. I
don t thmk that you can simply replace racial identity with some other
form of identity like class consciousness. This was a big desire at the

the big story of race in America, racial ideology was used to split white
working class off from upper class people. They weren' t mad at their
white betters because they got mad at poor Black p eople instead. So,
what we have to do, this argument continues, is eliminate that false racial consciousness and replace it w ith a true class consciousness. I don't
buy the initial scenario, generally speaking. Most whites were individualistic and pro-capitalist. They had economic views that blocked
class consciousness. And they didn' t simply swallow racism as a mistake. They were racist for a variety of reasons, including their esteem
for white ethnic identity.
I also .thin~ that you. can't ~imply take aw ay what is really a complex
cultural identity that is van egated and heterogeneous for d ifferent
kinds of white p eople and say that you now have to have a class consciousness instead of that. You can work with the m ultiple identities
that people have, w ith the knowledge that there are many identities
tha~ ~hite folks live w i.th on a daily basis and then try to pull out the
positive forms of ethnic and racial awareness that exist and couple
~hem. up w ith other identities that you are trying to reinforce, like an
identity as a w orker. I'm really interested in economic literacy. I think
that most people are economically undered ucated in the United States
and don't - can't - fully analyze what's going on, so I'd like to see
how changing that w ould actually fit with talking through coercive,
c?nstrictive racial identities, not into a non-racial identity, a non-white
~md of thing, but in to a non-racist, economically skeptical and idealistic awareness of one's racial placement in society.
dC: So, you would disagree w ith David Roediger when he argues for
the abolition of w hiteness. Would you argue that that is not a viable
option or even a productive one?
CN: I totally sympathize w ith the impulse that lies behind that. I also
~hare his interest in class p olitics. All groups need to start understanding better when the economy is not being run for them, so that there's a
revival of an und erstanding of w hat's really going on economically and
who's doing it and who's benefi ting from it, and so on. I think that's
ab.solutely crucial. I just d on't join it to racism in quite the same way. I
thmk p ost-capitalism and p ost-whiteness are linked but separate
projects. The links need to be constructed. There's no automatic connection. That is, anti-racism and class consciousness interact historically,
but they have to be pursued on a double track.
I think the two subjects w ill alw ays be talked about in sort of interactive way, w here for example, you start asking people why they feel
that they shouldn' t support certain kinds of sodal programs because
they are failu res. But w hy do they think these programs have failed? If
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you ask a white person, you almost always get a discourse about undeserving people who abuse lenient programs. If you ask, "Wouldn't you
be better off if we had social development monitored by a federal government that would actually support your retraining," for example,
and they say, "No, because I don't like social programs," and then you
argue that they don't like social programs partly because they think
that the people who benefit from these are undeserving, and then you
further suggest that they assume that most of those people are Black
and Mexican American, you are inevitably intertwining economics
with race. But, I don't think that getting people to be more anti-racist
makes them anti-capitalist or anti-elite, or more socially democratic. I
just don't see a simple connection between those two. That, to me, feels
like a wishful displacement of the categories.
I should also say that I don't know what it would mean to abolish
whiteness. I don't think that that's even possible. I would like to break
whiteness down into these different components and talk about the
components. I'm interested in the forms that white supremacy inhabits
today, the subtler ones. My own work- partly because of where I am
placed socially- concentrates on middle class forms of racial thinking,
and professional ones, ones that inhabit my own workplace in universities and corporate structures. If you could say, well, to get rid of whiteness means bolstering white people's desire for interracial and
interclass equality, I'd say great, but I don't know that the word whiteness can be used for that. I think you have to talk more directly about
things like equality, racial equality. Let's have equality of racial out.
comes. Why can't we talk about that?
For me, the question is really simple: let's figure out how we have to
structure the economy so that there are not these grotesque differences
in economic resources of, say, African-Americans and whites. When
you've discovered that the average household wealth for white Americans is $44, 000 and the average household wealth for Black Americans
is $4,000, you can say, okay, this is a problem that we actually have
ways to fix. I would like to talk to people more about why they think
it's okay for these major discrepancies to exist and then work through
the reasons they give, like they are lazy, or less educated, or they're culturally deficient, or whatever. Try to get to some other position. But my
goal is not abolishing whiteness, my goal is racial equality.
dC: You've talked in the past few minutes about social programs, and
in your 1994 MLA convention talk, "The Genesis of Liberal Racism,"
you argue that in order to replace liberal racism, "we must sever merit
from hierarchy." So, to look at a specific social program, can this be accomplished within the framework of Affirmative Action, or will we
need to formulate a new system and, if so, where might we go?

94

CN: Yes, we do need to formulate a new system. The Affirmative Action that was developed in the University of California and other universities assumes that there is a conflict between Affirmative Action
and rigorous meritocracy. The corollary assumption is that there is a
co~~lict betwe:n racia~ integration and rigorous meritocracy. The implicit assumption behind that is a conflict between the admission of
people of color and high standards, that whenever people of color are
l~t in, you are lowering the standards. This is based pretty much entirely on ag~regate averages for test scores of the different groups that
enter. Even In the 60s and 70s, no one tried to build a system based on a
broader understanding of the meaning of merit. Affirmative Action is a
symptom of a narrow, test-based notion of merit. Affirmative Action
actually has - not just the controversy about it, but the nature of that
system - delayed the serious reckoning with the hierarchical and narrow understanding of merit that's reigned since the Civil War. So I
thi~k it could be really exciting to rethink what kind of qualities a fi:ld
or ~1r?' really. wants to select for. We could start developing a more sophisticated discourse about what we are up to and that in turn would
mean .mu~h more clarity about the qualities that we want in the people
we bring In.
The police are a good example. It's becoming increasingly obvious
that the narrow selective service tests that were brought in to eliminate
nepotism in police forces don't really tell you who's going to be a good
p~lice officer in a particular community. If you are policing a community that speaks both English and Spanish or mostly Spanish, it's valuable for an officer to be able to speak Spanish. If police are evaluated
only by their performance on these tests, then you may lose a lot of
goo~ Spanish-speaking people; the test may punish the applicant for
havmg the quality you're looking for. If, on the other hand, the physics
department needs someone to solve math func tions at h igh speed, give
the applicants the GRE! So, it's becomin g really obvious to a lot of
people that we have to broaden out merit qualifications. I think we
should lead the way in the university rather than lagging in that
project.
dC: You've been talking about these structures within the university,
but what about the ways these structures operate w ithin corporate
structures, or the corporate world, as such? The current trend in diversity management stresses individual difference in a way that foregrounds racial and ethnic color, which seems to fu rther reinforce liberal
racism by legitimating the minorities without providing them access to
power. Minorities are still operating under a power structure in which
~he~ cannot participate, but the corporation gets the benefi t of saying it
ts diverse. So, how do we get around that and what d o you see going on
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CN: Yeah, well, there's bad news and there's good news arou~d this.
The bad news is that corporate America has actually lagged beh~nd society in terms of integration. It cannot present itself as a l~ader in ra~e
relations in this way, although more and more peopl~ are in~erested m
doing this, because it was first segregated and. no': is ena~ting ?ne of
the major effects of liberal racism in promoting integration without
equality - there are lots of people of color at lower le~els an,~ very fe:'
at higher levels of most corporations. The Bush-appmnted glass ceiling" commission found that about 96% of t~e inhabitants of corporate
boardrooms are white males; the rest are white women and a few black
men.
h
The good news, though, is that the people that work in uman r~sources are not old style liberal individualists, as are so ~any academic
humanists. They come out of different intellectual traditions. Many of
them are trained in the social sciences or business schools and they .get
Ph.D.s in fields like social psychology, industrial psycholog~, organ~za
tional development, organizational behavior. It sou.nd~ obv10u.s to Just
say it, but they have actually worked group ?ehav1or into their, thinking. So they have an easier time understanding that somebody; g~n
der, somebody's race, somebody's sexual pr~ference,. somebody s. first
language, somebody's cultural background 1~ co~phcat~d ways is always with them on the job. They have an easier time seemg th?se features not only as inevitable but also as assets that people can brmg to a
company that would actually help the company or can help the group
dynamics. So I think there's less of a conflict in div.ers~~ management
(and this is the first good thing about it) between 1nd1v:dual freedom
and group psychology, the private desires and the social factors. that
make us who we are. There's less of a tendency to reduce us to rational
actors, to the artistic solitary, or to his cousin, homo economicus, to the
kind of political subjects that have served as the ideal of so much racephobic thinking.
. .
The second good thing is that a lot of the people that work in d1ve~
sity management are people of color who not only have a lot ?f experience thinking very carefully and concretely about race experience b~t
who also come out of the Civil Rights movement and are tntereste~ m
continuing its basic work of racial integration. This is not a radical
agenda, but it is still one that has not been accomplished in any sect~r
of American society that I know of. So they have a pretty clear commitment more so than most academics, to making the business world
much more representative of society at large. I think t~at the co~ollary
of that concern is that as corporations downsize, as society polarizes by
economics, there's going to be a tendency for corporations to pull away
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from society. That could mean they w ill become more inaccessible citadels to people of color rather than more open to them. So as they see the
market globalize and as they see a kind of shallow interest in d iversity
taking hold and as they see polarization taking hold as well, some diversity managers want to make sure that there isn' t a new lockout as a
result of those forces. This is a really hard row to hoe and I don' t want
to underestimate the difficulty that they have or some of the limitations
of their own thinking because I am so aw are from my other work of the
entrenched nature of racist thinking in middle-class and professional
contexts. But I also have been very impressed with how focused, and in
some ways even militant, they are about the need to p ursue the integration agenda. Where we go from there is a whole separate story, but I
would be sorry if left-wing culture people in the academy dismissed
these diversity management folk because they are too corporate.
dC: In your essay "What was Political Correctness: Race, the Right, and
Managerial Democracy in the Humanities," you talk about how the
university needs to replace its current managerial democracy with selfdirection and reconnect scholarship to politics. Then, in what you just
said, you talk about the ways in which many academics reject corporate
thinking because of their lack of certain political directions. What kind
of changes do we need to eliminate liberal racism within the university
and to allow us to work with the corporate sector to create a more integrated and racially d iverse society?
CN: Well, that's complicated because there are a lot of different terms
working at once. The first thing I should say is that by this idea of reconnecting scholarship to politics, I don't really mean that all scholarship must be more politically engaged. I don't think that's true. I believe in knowledge for its own sake and I believe that a lot of times you
really do have to disconnect your thinking from all sorts of conventional structures in order to make it happen, and by that I mean not just
depoliticizing it but trying to break with your conventional wisdom
and your own situatedness. But there's also reconnection: we have to be
less phobic about this situatedness, and other people's as well. So I
would defend intellectual work that sees itself as personally motivated
or having political outcomes and implications. I mean, I certainly see
my own work on the limited forms of freedom and the unbelievable
levels of inequality that we tolerate in the United States as motivated in
part by my own general political belief, which is also an intellectual
one, that the United States is going to have to get more egalitarian or
it's going to go nowhere, it's going to stagnate as a society. So those
things are always working with all of us and I would like more honesty
about that.
The other part of the answer is implicit in your question, which is
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that one way of dealing with forms of liberal racism in the academy is
by linking fear of race-coded difference with fear of full democracy.
Academics favor a halfway covenant between for ms of consent and
participation that are simultaneously managed and controlled by
people above. As you probably know from your own work in the university, this is the structure of most of our existence. Faculty members
are supposed to be on all sorts of committees where they spend huge
numbers of hours doing work and participating and being involved
and consulted but where they don't really have much power over the
actual decision. I think that is psychologically very debilitating. We get
used to impotence, used to lack of political sovereignty over even our
own local structures, and we don' t expect any more. We become very
cynical about participation, so w e tend to withdraw at the first opportunity, which only accentuates the way the power circulates among cronies and higher-ups in stratified systems.
This is connected to racial attitudes because it habituates people to
non-dissent. When you know the final decision is supposed to be made
by somebody else, dissent just seems like trouble-making. It rattles
people. It doesn't seem like the first step on the way to a new understanding that we' re all going to work out as a group. It just seems a
shaking of the tree which is supposed to more and less stay the way
that it is. Fear of dissent and fear of difference: they need to be confronted at the same time.
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